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Abstract 
We make a case for price-increasing competition on “competitive bottleneck” two-sided 
markets. Unlike previous literature on price-increasing competition and two-sided markets, 
we abstract from product/platform differentiation, structural differences, scale effects, search 
costs, and capacity constraints, which would per se favor the one or the other market 
structure. We argue that demand interrelation as given on many competitive bottleneck two-
sided markets might be sufficient to cause either no observable price effect of competition or 
price-increasing competition under certain conditions. We derive these conditions and 
illustrate the economic intuition. Under price equality, virtually everything except for the 
number of platform operators is identical in monopoly and duopoly. Nevertheless, total 
demand on both market sides in the duopoly market exceeds total demand in the monopoly 
market. Furthermore, even though there is no observable price effect, there is still a 
competitive effect that becomes manifest in total duopoly equilibrium profits being strictly 
smaller than monopoly profits. The relationship of total welfare is ambiguous in subsidization 
cases, while it is strictly greater in duopoly, if no subsidization takes place. 
 
Keywords: two-sided markets, platform competition, price-concentration relationship, 
welfare analysis, price-increasing competition 
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1. Introduction 
When teaching students the basic insights of microeconomics, most economists claim that 
competition decreases prices and increases welfare as compared to a monopoly market. This 
standard view of the relationship of competition and prices is further deepened when teaching 
the standard Bertrand-model of duopolistic competition, i.e. when claiming that price 
competition among two firms is sufficient to create perfect competition. But is it really that 
clear, easy, and straightforward? A number of theoretical contributions present models that 
predict the opposite effect. This literature basically argues that product differentiation or 
search costs may lead to price-increasing competition. We argue that the “two-sidedness” of 
markets might also be an explanation for this phenomenon without relying on product 
differentiation or the like. 
The economic literature on two-sided markets studies markets in which intermediary services, 
called “platforms”, facilitate interaction between distinct and distinguishable groups of agents, 
called “market sides”. The distinct feature of these platform industries is that each market 
side’s utility from joining a platform is affected by the platform’s diffusion on the other 
market side. In other words, each agent’s decision to join or not to join a platform exerts an 
externality on agents on the other market side (Rochet and Tirole (2003)). We assume  a 
“competitive bottleneck” two-sided market (Armstrong (2006)) and argue that under specific 
conditions there is a demand-enhancing effect of competition on the single-homing market 
side, which drives prices upwards. On the other hand, platform competition has the opposite 
effect on prices. We show that it is possible that the latter effect does not fully compensate the 
former effect, which either causes no observable price effect or price-increasing competition. 
To focus solely on the effects of the two-sidedness, we neither allow for platform 
differentiation, nor do we impose structural differences in terms of costs, scale effects or 
capacity constraints that might per se favor the one or the other market structure. 
The question of price changes with regard to market structure becomes relevant when policy 
makers consider subsidies in order to attract new entrants to given monopoly markets. 
Reversely, antitrust authorities need to assess the impact of mergers on prices. A positive 
correlation of price and market concentration is also the fundamental assumption of the 
empirical price-concentration literature that aims at measuring the price effect of market 
concentration.  
The paper is constructed as follows: After briefly reviewing the relevant literature, we 
develop a monopoly model and derive the monopolist’s optimal pricing policy. In Section 4, 
we suggest a model of duopolistic competition that is founded on the same assumptions as the 
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monopoly model, thus being fully comparable. In Section 5, we compare the equilibrium 
outcome in duopoly and the monopolist’s optimum. In Section 6 we illustrate our main 
propositions using numerical examples. Finally, we conclude and highlight some implications 
of our findings in Section 7. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The term “two-sided” or “multi-sided market” describes a situation in which two or more 
distinct and distinguishable groups of agents interact via an intermediary. This intermediary, 
usually called “platform”, charges all groups per transaction and/or for platform access, 
thereby determining total transaction costs (Rochet and Tirole (2006)). Agents may or may 
not obtain intrinsic utility from joining a platform. More importantly, demand of one market 
side affects the utility the other market side obtains from joining a platform. The platform 
therefore needs “to get both sides on board” (Rochet and Tirole (2003)). Generally, it is hard 
to draw conclusions from general formulations of two-sided market models, because a 
number of contradicting assumptions seem plausible, depending on the context. 
In Rochet and Tirole (2003)’s credit card example, the number of retailers connected to a 
specific credit card network, positively affects the utility of consumers, who wish to pay using 
this credit card and vice versa. In media economics two-sidedness is present in the relation of 
the media provider, media consumers, and advertisers. However, unlike in the credit card 
example, most theoretical models assume that media consumers wish to consume the media 
content only, and are “coerced” to consume advertising as well (see e.g. Anderson and Coate 
(2005), Gabszewicz et al. (2004), Gal-Or and Dukes (2003), Peitz and Valletti (2008))1. 
Empirical results support this “ad-aversion” assumption for television viewers (see e.g. 
Danaher (1995), Wilbur (2007)), but find “ad-liking” for print media (Kaiser and Song 
(2009), Rysman (2004)). 
Credit cards and media products also serve as an example to illustrate a second crucial aspect: 
Excludability of agents who are not willing to pay. While a credit card service can refuse to 
accommodate specific consumers and retailers, and therefore charge both market sides for its 
services, media consumers cannot be excluded from free-to-air broadcasting services, so they 
cannot be charged for consuming it (see the seminal paper by Anderson and Coate (2005)). 
Third, credit cards are goods that allow for joint consumption or “multi-homing” as it is 
called in the two-sided market literature. That is, consumers are able to own more than one 
credit card and retailers can accept more than one card, while in media applications 
                                                 
1 Models that consider “ad-liking” are e.g. Gabszewicz et al. (2006), Häckner and Nyberg (2008), Kind and 
Stähler (2010), Rasch (2007). 
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consumers are often assumed to single-home, e.g. a moviegoer has to decide for exactly one 
cinema on a Saturday night, but a firm can place advertisements in more than one movie 
theater.  
These selected aspects illustrate, why literature on two-sided markets tailors models around 
specific examples. For instance, Armstrong (2006) gives a media economic example in his 
seminal study of pricing in a “competitive bottleneck” scenario. A “competitive bottleneck” is 
a two-sided market in which one market side is restricted to single-homing, while the other 
market side is able to multi-home. Armstrong (2006) derives optimal pricing rules for 
monopoly and duopoly markets in terms of elasticities and finds that there is no difference in 
advertising prices between monopolies and oligopolies. He argues that competition only 
emerges on the market for media consumers: Media providers compete for consumers, since 
advertisers’ demand depends on the number of consumers that are exposed to the 
advertisement, and consumers -by assumption- need to single-home. However, media 
providers are still monopolists when providing their consumers’ attention to the advertiser, 
because a specific consumer can only be reached by advertising with the platform this 
consumer chose. If the advertisers’ willingness to pay is sufficiently high, the platform might 
reduce its prices for consumers even below marginal costs, i.e. it “subsidizes” consumers out 
of advertising revenues. 
Counter-intuitive price effects with regard to competition on a competitive bottleneck 
duopoly have already been reported by Chandra and Collard-Wexlar (2009). They compare 
pricing under duopolistic competition and joint management of two platforms. Similar to our 
paper, they find that under specific conditions a merger might lead to a price decrease instead 
of a price increase. However, their argument and setting is completely different than ours. In 
their model, platforms can exert negative externalities on each other’s profit by increasing 
their prices. Under joint management this externality would be internalized, which might 
result in lower monopoly prices. The basic economic effect in their model is analog to the 
well-known effects occurring when merging two firms with complementary products on a 
traditional one-sided market. 
Price-increasing competition on one-sided markets has also been reported as the result of 
product differentiation (see Chen and Riordan (2008), Melzer and Morgan (2009), and 
Bertoletti et al. (2008) for recent contributions and the references therein) and in the presence 
of search costs (Janssen and Moraga-González (2004), Schulz and Stahl (1996)). In contrast, 
we explicitly assume a homogeneous good and perfect information of all agents, and focus 
solely on the two-sidedness of the market to explain price-increasing competition. 
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3. The Monopoly Model 
Consider a two-sided market for a consumption good that is offered in combination with 
advertising. To foster intuition and readability, we will label customers on the one market side 
“consumers” and customers on the other market side “advertisers”. In this section, we assume 
that the market is served by a monopolistic platform operator. Similar to Anderson and 
Gabszewicz (2006), we assume that consumers are homogeneous, except for their preference 
for the good (say e.g. “movie theater experience”). Let the individual net utility function be 
additive-separable and given by 
(1) { }1,0,)( ∈⋅−⋅⋅α−⋅θ= ccccaccc qqpqnqqU , 
where pc is the price for one unit of the consumption good, while θ is the taste parameter or 
marginal willingness to pay, qc is the quantity, and α is a parameter for the influence of 
advertising quantity na on the individual’s utility. Heterogeneous preferences for the good are 
reflected by θ, which is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, θ ], where θ > 
0 determines the market size for the considered goods market. We limit qc to the values 0 and 
1, so that the individual’s decision problem is reduced to whether or not to consume a single 
unit of the good (e.g. whether to go to the movies or not). Obviously, an individual demands 
the good, if its net utility of doing so is greater than the net utility of refraining from 
consumption, that is if 
cacc pnUU +⋅α≥θ⇔=≥ 0)0()1(  
holds. Therefore, we obtain 
(2) ( ) ca
pn
acc pndnpn
ca
−⋅α−θ=θ⋅= ∫θ
+⋅α
1,  
as the aggregated consumer demand function on the market. 
 
Similar to Armstrong (2006), firms are assumed to generate constant net profits from 
advertising. For simplicity, we assume advertisements to be standardized, so that firms only 
decide whether or not to place an advertisement. Therefore a single firm’s advertising demand 
qa is either 0 or 1. The firm’s net profit is given by 
(3) { }1,0,)( ∈⋅⋅−⋅µ=Π aacaaaa qqnpqq , 
where nc is the number of consumers, pa is the per-contact advertising price, so that the firm 
has to pay pa·nc to place an advertisement. µ is the parameter that describes the gross benefit 
of advertising. Firms are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to µ, and µ is assumed to 
be uniformly distributed on [0, cn⋅µ ]. The expression cn⋅µ , with µ  > 0 determines the size 
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of the advertising market. Note that the net profit to be gained from advertising and therefore 
the size of the advertising market depends on consumer demand. The economic intuition is 
straightforward: The higher the demand for the good, the more consumers will be exposed to 
the advertisement, the more profitable advertising becomes to a firm. Firms are willing to 
advertise, if their net profit from doing so is positive, that is if 
caaa np ⋅≥µ⇔=Π≥Π 0)0()1( . 
Hence, total advertising demand is given by  
(4) ( ) cac
n
np
caa npndnpn
c
ca
⋅−⋅µ=µ⋅= ∫
⋅µ
⋅
1, . 
This specific functional form assures that na(pa,0) = 0, which implies that there is no demand 
for advertising if consumer demand is equal to zero. 
Solving equations (2) and (4) for pc and pa yields the inverse demand functions. We assume 
fixed and variable costs to be zero and capacity constraints to be non-binding. Thus, the 
monopolist’s optimization problem is  
( ) 


 −µ⋅⋅+−⋅α−θ⋅=Π
c
a
cacacMnn n
n
nnnnn
ac ,
max , 
yielding the first order conditions 
( )η⋅−θ⋅= ac nn 21 , where µ−α=η  
η⋅⋅−= ca nn 2
1  
Therefore, the optimal monopoly solution is 
(5) 24
2
η−
θ⋅=Mcn    (6) 42 −η
θ⋅η=Man  
(7) ( )24
2
η−
θ⋅+η⋅µ=Mcp   (8) 2
µ+α=Map , 
and yields a monopoly profit of 
(9) 2
2
4 η−
θ=Π M . 
 
An economically plausible solution requires that quantities and profit are nonnegative, i.e. 
0,, ≥ΠMMaMc nn . Note that optimal pricing on two-sided markets might involve prices below 
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marginal cost (“subsidization”) for one market side. To determine economically plausible 
parameter sets, we consider three cases:2 
If consumers are ad-averse (α > 0), ( ) ( ){ }µ≤α<−µ>µ∈αµ )2,0max(,0,  yields plausible 
solutions. For ad-neutral consumers (α = 0), 20 <µ<  is required and in case consumers are 
ad-likers (α < 0), the model yields plausible results for ( ) ( ){ }02,20, <α<−µ<µ<∈αµ . 
 
4. A Model of Duopolistic Competition 
In this section, we develop a model of duopolistic competition in order to identify competitive 
effects on the market that has been presented in the former section. Since our paper focuses 
on the comparison of monopoly and duopoly markets, all assumptions of Section 2 remain, 
except that we now assume the market to be served by two identical platforms, denoted 
i = 1,2.  
The consumption good offered by both platforms is assumed to be perfectly homogenous (e.g. 
two multiplexes offering the same menu of movies in direct proximity). Just like the 
monopolist, the duopolists are assumed to produce without variable and fixed costs. 
Consumers are assumed to be the same utility-maximizing individuals they were in the 
previous section. Additionally, we assume that consumers are required to single-home, that is, 
if they join, they will have to decide for one and only one platform to join (e.g. a moviegoer 
can only be in one cinema at the same time)3. Obviously, consumers will prefer the platform 
that offers most net utility. If consumers’ net utility is equal on both platforms, aggregate 
demand is assumed to be equally shared among the two operators. Thus, using equation (1) 
for qc = 1 and equation (2), the consumer demand function platform operator i faces is 
(10) ( ) jiji
pnpnforpn
pnpnforpn
pnpnfor
npn
j
c
j
a
i
c
i
a
i
c
i
a
j
c
j
a
i
c
i
a
i
c
i
a
j
c
j
a
i
c
i
a
i
a
i
c
i
c ≠=



−⋅α−θ>−⋅α−θ−⋅α−θ
−⋅α−θ=−⋅α−θ−⋅α−θ
−⋅α−θ<−⋅α−θ
= ,2,1,
2
0
,  
  
Unlike consumers, advertisers are allowed to multi-home, which implies that they can place a 
single unit of advertising on one platform only or on both platforms simultaneously. 
Therefore, the advertisers’ decision problem only depends on the advertising price and the 
                                                 
2 Remember that we restricted θ > 0. Since throughout (5) - (9) θ only appears -if at all- as a factor in the 
numerator, and therefore only has a scaling function, we will ignore θ in the parameter sets to simplify notation. 
We will apply this simplification throughout the paper. 
3 Note that going to the movies at another time of the day or at another day would be product differentiation, 
which we intentionally abstract from, to focus solely on the effect of “two-sidedness”. 
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consumer demand of the corresponding platform. In other words, platform i’s advertising 
demand does not directly depend on platform j’s behavior.4 Using equation (4), advertising 
demand of platform i is therefore given by 
(11) ( ) ( )iaiciciaiciciaia pnnpnnpn −µ⋅=⋅−⋅µ=, , 
which is analog to Section 2. 
 
We assume that both platforms compete in a Bertrand-type pricing game, simultaneously 
choosing prices pci and pai. Since the platforms are perfectly identical, we focus on symmetric 
equilibria.5 Generally, a symmetric solution for i,j = 1,2,  i ≠ j is characterized by  
s
c
j
c
i
c ppp ==  and sajaia ppp == , 
which implies 
(12) ( )
2
s
cs
a
s
a
j
a
i
a
npnnn ⋅−µ=== , 
where nas is the advertising demand faced by one platform operator, while ncs is the aggregate 
consumer demand in the market, equally shared among the operators, given any symmetric 
solution pcs and pas. In order to calculate ncs, we have to take into account that single-homing 
consumers are interested in the amount of advertising on each platform, which is nas. The 
total number of ads nai + naj = 2 · nas is not relevant for consumers’ decision making. Thus, 
using equations (2) and (12), aggregate consumer demand is given by 
(13) ( ) ( )sa
s
cs
c
s
c
s
cs
a
s
c
s
a
s
c
p
pnpnppnn
−µ⋅α⋅+
−θ=⇔−⋅−µ⋅α−θ=−⋅α−θ=
2
112
, 
so that nas can be expressed as 
(14) ( ) ( )sa
s
cs
a
s
a p
ppn −µ⋅α+
−θ⋅−µ=
2
. 
Therefore, for any given pcs and pas, firm i’s profit in the symmetry case is  
(15) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )



−µ⋅α+
−θ⋅−µ+⋅−µ⋅α+
−θ=Π s
a
s
cs
a
s
a
s
cs
a
s
cs
a
s
c
s
i p
pppp
p
ppp
22
, . 
                                                 
4 It is, of course, indirectly dependent of j’s behavior, because nai depends on nci, and by (10), nci depends on ncj. 
5 See Nilssen and Sørgard (2001) for a model with heterogeneous platforms and asymmetric equilibria. 
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Suppose that the candidate equilibrium (pc*, pa*) is characterized by 
***
c
j
c
i
c ppp ==    *** ajaia ppp == . 
In this case, platform operator i’s deviation strategies can be defined as 
( ) ****//// ,, jcjajcjalowiclowialowialowic pppnpnforpp −⋅α−θ<−⋅α−θ  
( ) ****//// ,, jcjajcjaequalicequaliaequaliaequalic pppnpnforpp −⋅α−θ=−⋅α−θ , 
( ) ****//// ,, jcjajcjahighichighiahighiahighic pppnpnforpp −⋅α−θ>−⋅α−θ  
where (pci/low, pai/low) is a strategy that implies lower consumer utility, (pci/equal, pai/equal) is a 
strategy that implies the same consumer utility, and (pci/high, pai/high) is a strategy that implies 
higher consumer utility than strategy (pc*, pa*). Note that platform operator i might deviate by 
changing one or both prices, and that the operator might alter both prices in the same direction 
or in opposing directions. Therefore the indices low, equal, and high do not imply prices in 
the deviation strategy being higher, equal or lower than the equilibrium candidate prices. 
  
The well-known condition for a Nash equilibrium is that operator i cannot deviate profitably, 
which means that (pc*, pa*) is an equilibrium, if and only if 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )**//**** ,,,,,, jajclowialowicijajciaicsi pppppppp Π≥Π  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )**//**** ,,,,,, jajcequaliaequalicijajciaicsi pppppppp Π≥Π , 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )**//**** ,,,,,, jajchighiahighicijajciaicsi pppppppp Π≥Π  
Thus, in order to find equilibria, we will have to analyze these cases separately. We will do 
this, using the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: If platform operator i deviates by choosing any (pci/low, pai/low), the resulting 
profit is always Πilow(.) = 0. 
Proof: Equation (10) implies that nci(.) = 0, which means that demand for platform i is taking 
the value zero as all consumers will decide to use the rival platform j. In addition, using 
equation (11) we obtain nai(.) = 0, because advertisers are not willing to place an ad on 
platform i, when there are no consumers. Thus, for any (pci/low, pai/low) i’s profit is zero. 
(q.e.d.) 
 
As economic intuition suggests, it is not profitable for a platform operator to deviate by 
offering less consumer utility than the rival platform. Since any equilibrium with Πi(.) < 0 is 
not economically plausible, there will never be an incentive for operator i to charge 
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(pci/low, pai/low). Therefore, this strategy can be neglected for further analysis of candidate 
equilibria.   
 
Proposition 2: Suppose platform operator i is maximizing her profit, while offering the same 
utility as operator j by charging any (pci/equal, pai/equal). Then, it is always profit-maximizing to 
charge the monopoly advertising price. 
Proof: Since both platforms offer equal consumer utility, we know that  
(16) */*/**// jc
equali
a
j
a
equali
c
j
c
j
a
equali
c
equali
a pnnppnpn +⋅α−⋅α=⇔−⋅α−θ=−⋅α−θ  
must hold, which also implies that i’s consumer demand, denoted by nci/equal, is fixed. Solving 
(11) for the advertising price gives the inverse advertising demand function as  
equali
c
equali
aequali
a n
np /
/
/ −µ= . 
Therefore, operator i’s (constrained) maximization problem is 
( ) ( ) equaliaequalicequali
c
equali
aequali
c
j
c
equali
a
j
a
equali
ai nnn
n
npnnd ///
/
/*/*/max ⋅⋅


 −µ+⋅+⋅α−⋅α=Π , 
yielding 
(17) 
22
*/
/
*/ α+µ=⇔η⋅−= equalia
equali
cequali
a p
nn , 
from which we see that the profit-maximizing advertising price is equal to the optimal 
monopoly advertising price (8). 
(q.e.d.) 
 
Proposition 2 implies a very important result: In any symmetric situation, operator i’s 
deviation profit implied by (17) is at least as great as the profit in the symmetric situation 
(proof: see Appendix 1). Therefore, in any symmetric situation there is an incentive to charge 
the monopoly advertising price. Since the platforms are identical, we can expect that 
naj* = nai/equal*, so that (16) simplifies to pci/equal = pcj*. Thus, we can tentatively conclude that a 
symmetric equilibrium requires  
(18) 
2
** α+µ== jaia pp  
for any pci* = pcj*. However, at this stage of our analysis the equilibrium level of the consumer 
price remains unspecified. 
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Proposition 3: When offering consumers more net utility than her rival firm, thus charging 
(pci/high, pai/high), platform operator i’s profit-maximizing strategy is either (i) the monopoly 
solution or (ii) nci/high = θ  – pcj*. 
Proof: In order to attract all consumers, the constraint 
(19) **//**// jc
j
a
highi
c
highi
a
j
c
j
a
highi
c
highi
a pnpnpnpn −⋅α−>−⋅α−⇔−⋅α−θ>−⋅α−θ  
must be satisfied. From equation (10) we know that consumer demand for operator i is  
(20) highic
highi
a
highi
c
highi
c
highi
a
highi
c nnppnn
////// −⋅α−θ=⇔−⋅α−θ= . 
As long as (19) is satisfied, rival platform j’s consumer demand is equal to zero, which 
implies that j’s advertising demand is also zero. Therefore, we assume that consumers 
anticipate that na j* = 0, so that (19) simplifies to 
(21) ( ) */*/// jchighicjchighichighiahighia pnpnnn −θ>⇔−>−⋅α−θ−⋅α− . 
The corresponding (Kuhn-Tucker-) optimization problem for operator i can be expressed as 
( ) ( ) highiahighichighi
c
highi
ahighi
c
highi
a
highi
c
highi
a
highi
ci nnn
n
nnnnn ///
/
///// ,max ⋅⋅


 −µ+−⋅α−θ⋅=Π  
( )*/ jchighic pn +θ−λ+ , 
which yields the monopoly solution of Section 2 if (21) is not binding, i.e. λ = 0. In case (21) 
is binding (λ > 0)6, operator i will choose the slightest possible nci/high without violating the 
constraint. The resulting solution is approximately  
(22) **/ jc
highi
c pn −θ=  
(q.e.d.). 
 
Since case (i) of Proposition 3 does not contain equilibria, we now further investigate case 
(ii). This case holds as long as Mc
highi
c nn ≤*/  which corresponds to  
( )( )42ˆ 2
2
−η
−η⋅θ=≤ cc pp , 
where cpˆ  solves 
M
c
highi
c nn =*/ . Given (22), pai/high* still matches the monopoly solution and 
nai/high* becomes 
( )
2
*
*/ η⋅θ−=
j
chighi
a
pn . 
Using nai/high* as well as equations (20) and (22), the resulting consumer price is described by 
                                                 
6 It can be shown that there is no equilibrium in the non-binding case as deviation to the monopoly solution 
would always be profitable, and the monopoly solution is not an equilibrium solution. 
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( ) ***/
2
j
c
j
chighi
c p
pp +η⋅−θ⋅α= . 
Therefore, operator i’s deviation profit can be expressed as 
(23) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]**2** 4
4
1 j
c
j
c
j
c
j
c
high
i pppp ⋅+−θ⋅η⋅−θ⋅=Π , 
which is defined for all c
j
c pp ˆ
* ≤ . 
 
Proposition 4: For ad-averse consumers ( )0>α , symmetric equilibria are characterized by 
M
aa pp =*  and *** ccc ppp ≤≤ , where  
( )( )[ ]
ζ
θ⋅µ⋅−−η⋅α⋅η+⋅α⋅η= 12820
2
*
cp , and 
( )
82
22
*
−η
α−µ=
c
p , with 
( )( )( )[ ] 321281244 2 −µ⋅−µ⋅+−η⋅αη+⋅α⋅η=ζ .  
For ad-neutral consumers ( )0=α  and ad-liking consumers ( )0<α , there is no equilibrium 
solution. 
Proof:  Symmetric equilibria are characterized by the results of Propositions 2 and 3. As 
stated before, Proposition 2 implies that both platform operators charge the monopoly 
advertising price in equilibrium, given any consumer price. Equilibrium consumer prices can 
be obtained by the results of Proposition 3, because there is no incentive for deviation, if the 
deviation profit, given by (23), does not exceed the platform’s profit in the symmetry case. 
Therefore, in equilibrium 
( ) ( )*** , acsichighi ppp Π≤Π  
must hold. 
Given (18) and using equations (15) and (23), it is easy to verify that ( )*chighi pΠ  and 
( )**, acsi ppΠ  intersect exactly once at *cp , where 
(24) ( )( )[ ]ζ θ⋅µ⋅−−η⋅α⋅η+⋅α⋅η= 12820
2
*
cp . 
 
Assuming ad-aversion ( )0>α , and given the corresponding parameter restrictions of the 
monopoly model we see that  
**
cc pc
s
i
pc
high
i
pp ∂
Π∂>∂
Π∂
 and 0>∂
Π∂
c
high
i
p
, 
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which implies that *cp  is the upper bound of the continuum of equilibrium consumer prices. 
The lower bound is given by the root of ( )**, acsi ppΠ , that is, where duopolists realize zero 
profits, i.e. at 
( )
82
22
*
−η
α−µ=
c
p . 
Assuming ad-liking ( )0<α  or ad-neutrality ( )0=α , and the corresponding restrictions of the 
monopoly model, there are no equilibria, because ( ) ( ) [ ]cccacsichighi pppppp ˆ,, **** ∈∀Π>Π . 
(q.e.d.) 
 
Proposition 4 states that the duopoly model only yields equilibrium solutions for the case of 
ad-averse consumers, while there are no equilibria in the cases of ad-neutrality and ad-liking. 
This outcome corresponds to economic intuition. If consumers are ad-averse, the deviating 
platform gains from two specific economic effects: By offering more net-utility, the firm is 
able to exploit the whole consumer demand, instead of equally sharing the market. In 
addition, a higher number of consumers on this platform shifts the advertising demand 
function, resulting in a higher level of advertising. Thus, the deviating platform is able to 
generate a higher profit. However, ad-averse consumers are facing a disutility from 
advertising, which implies that the higher advertising level in turn shifts the aggregate 
consumer demand function on the market downwards. This effect makes deviation less 
profitable. 
In the case of ad-neutrality, a deviating firm still gains from serving the whole consumer 
demand and the resulting enhancing effect on advertising demand, while there is no ad 
disutility for consumers and, consequently, no negative effect on consumer demand. 
Therefore, the profit from deviation is, ceteris paribus, higher than in the case of ad-aversion, 
making deviation more likely to occur. This also holds for ad-liking consumers, where 
deviation is even more profitable, because higher advertising levels increase consumers’ 
willingness to pay. Obviously, the deviation profit for 0<α  and 0=α  is higher than in the 
case of ad-aversion ( )0>α , which intuitively underpins our finding that there are no 
equilibria in these cases.  
 
5. Analysis of the Model 
In the previous sections we developed a competitive bottleneck two-sided market model and 
determined the monopolist’s optimum as well as the duopoly equilibria. In this section we are 
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going to study these outcomes more deeply. We will specifically focus on the comparison of 
monopoly and duopoly in terms of prices, quantities, and welfare. Furthermore, we will focus 
rather on those cases that are counterintuitive or contrary to common economic knowledge 
from traditional one-sided markets, i.e. cases in which equilibrium duopoly prices equal or 
even exceed optimal monopoly prices. 
Since there are no equilibria in the cases of ad-neutrality and ad-liking, we strictly focus 
further analysis on the case of ad-averse consumers, where a continuum of equilibrium 
consumer prices exists. We assume that both platform operators select the equilibrium 
solution that generates the highest consumer price.7 Thus, the resulting equilibrium strategy is 
( )*** , ccMaa pppp == . The corresponding equilibrium is therefore characterized by (17) and 
(24), yielding 
(25) ( )ζ
η⋅α−⋅η⋅θ⋅=== 24*** jaiaa nnn  
(26) ( )ζ
−η⋅α⋅θ⋅=== 28*** jcicc nnn  
(27) ( )( )( )( )222*** 24268 ζ −η⋅α−η⋅αµ⋅+−η⋅α⋅η⋅θ⋅=Π=Π=Π ji , 
where an economically plausible symmetric equilibrium solution obviously requires  
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,,,, ****** ≥Π acsaacscacsi ppnppnpp , 
which in case of ad-aversion (α > 0), is given for parameter sets satisfying  
 ( ) ( ){ },,0, µ≤α≤τ>µ∈αµ  where  
τ = R2 of ( ) ( ) x6-+x-12+ 223 ⋅µ⋅µ⋅x .8,9 
 
Prices and Quantities 
To see if there exist parameter tuples ( µ , α ) given which duopoly prices equalize or exceed 
monopoly prices, we first remember that by Proposition 2 the duopoly advertising price in 
equilibrium equals the monopoly advertising price. The intuition of this result follows the 
standard argument of Armstrong (2006), who argues that on a competitive bottleneck two-
                                                 
7 The qualitative results and conclusions of the following sections do not depend on the selected equilibrium as it 
can be shown that all results also hold for the equilibrium strategy ( )*** ,
cc
M
aa pppp == , which implies that both 
operators charge the lowest possible consumer price (see Appendix 3). 
8 Rl, l = 1,...,n, denotes the l-th real-valued polynomial root in ascending order of the corresponding polynomial 
of degree n. 
9 Since θ  already turned out to be a nonnegative scaling factor only, we will suppress it in the notation, that is, 
we will give tuples ( µ , α ) only. 
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sided market each platform is a monopolist towards the multi-homing market side, because a 
specific agent on the single-homing side can only be reached by joining the platform this 
agent chose. Our analysis therefore needs to focus on consumer prices only. Using (7) and 
(24), the parameter sets we are interested in solve 
(28) ( )( )[ ] ( ) Mcc pp =η− θ⋅+η⋅µ≥ζ θ⋅µ⋅−−η⋅α⋅η+⋅α⋅η= 2
2
*
4
212820 . 
These parameter sets can be expressed as 
(29) ( ) ( )









 α≤α
+α⋅+−α≤µ≤δβ∈αµ 2,141,max,
22
, where 
β = R1 of 32+12+8-+)2-5+(-4x +2)-8-(32x+)-(1 4x+ 246352422324 αααααααααααx , and 
δ = R3 of 32+12+8-+)2-5+(-4x +2)-8-(32x+)-(1 4x+ 246352422324 αααααααααααx . 
 
Cases with consumer prices being equal in monopoly and duopoly are those cases satisfying 
(28) with equality. These cases are given by the lower bounds of µ  in (29) that is if 
( ) ( )( ){ }α≤δβ∈αµ 2,,max, . For 955.32 ≈γ<α≤ , ( ) βδβ =,max , and the result is a 
subsidization solution10. For γ>α , ( ) δ=δβ,max , and there is no subsidization. In all these 
cases, there is no observable price effect of competition. To gain deeper insight into the 
economics of this phenomenon, we evaluate demands and profits at any of these ( µ , α ) and 
see that 
*** 2, a
M
aa
M
cc nnnnn ⋅<<> , and MΠ<Π⋅ *2 . 
Remember that na* is advertising quantity per duopolist, hence 2·na* is total advertising on the 
duopoly market. ( ) ( )( ){ }α≤δβ∈αµ 2,,max,  describes a situation, in which the mere fact 
that the market is served by two identical firms instead of one, causes an increase in total 
consumer demand. While in the traditional one-sided world, increases in total consumer 
demand stem from the fact that duopolistic competition yields lower prices, the situation 
described here is more complex, because there is no observable price effect of competition. 
The reason for the enhancement in total consumer demand is the two-sidedness of the market 
or more precisely, the effect of a decreasing amount of advertising per platform on consumer 
utility. To illustrate the economics of this case, we do the following gedankenexperiment: 
Starting from some monopolistic optimum ncM > 0, naM > 0, we imagine that -all else equal- 
                                                 
10 The special case ( ) ( )2,22, =αµ  with ( ) 22,max =δ=δβ , which is discussed in Appendix 3, is also a 
subsidization solution. 
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the monopolist is replaced by two identical, but independent platforms. In this case, total 
consumer demand ncM will be equally divided among the two platforms. As a consequence, 
advertising with one platform only reaches half of the consumers, which will reduce 
advertising demand per platform to some nan < naM. Since we assumed α > 0, the decrease in 
advertising exposure increases the willingness to pay of each consumer by an amount equal to 
( )naMa nn −α . Since the willingness to pay of each consumer increases, the demand function 
shifts to the outside. If both platforms colluded, they would exploit this additional willingness 
to pay by setting a higher price (see Appendix 2). Since there is no observable price effect in 
either direction, there must be a countervailing effect - the unobservable price effect of 
platform competition, which in this case just compensates the price increasing effect of 
increased willingness to pay. Therefore, prices remain equal, but total consumer demand 
increases to some quantity ncn > ncM. 
 
Price-increasing competition occurs, if (28) is satisfied with strict inequality. The 
corresponding parameter sets are subsets of (29), i.e. 
( ) ( )









 α≤α
+α⋅+−α≤µ<δβ∈αµ 2,141,max,
22
 
As is the case of price equality, there are subsidization solutions and solutions with positive 
prices. However, it is now also possible that the monopolist charges negative consumer 
prices, while the duopolists do not. In the case of subsidization, less negative prices in 
duopoly can be interpreted as a lower subsidization of consumers as compared to monopoly. 
In case of price-increasing competition, the effect of platform competition does not fully 
compensate the effect of demand-enhancement. Therefore, the relationships of quantities are 
less straightforward and partly ambiguous without further refinement of the parameter sets. 
Before doing so, let us first note some results that hold for the whole case of price-increasing 
competition: Evaluated at any of the corresponding ( µ ,
α
α ), we see that  
MΠ<Π⋅ *2 and Maa nn <* , 
which is so far consistent with the results obtained for price equality. There is a competitive 
effect on profits, because despite of the price increase, industry wide profits are lower in 
duopoly than in monopoly. Furthermore, advertising demand per platform is lower in duopoly 
than in monopoly. However, because of the negative effect of consumer price on consumer 
demand, the demand-enhancing effect of lower advertising that shifts the consumer demand 
function to the outside is partially compensated by the price increase, which corresponds to a 
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move along the (shifted) demand function, ( *cn ⋛ Mcn ), and total advertising quantity does not 
necessarily exceed the monopoly level ( *2 an⋅ ⋛ Man ). 
Parameter sets contained in  
( ) ( )









 αα
+α⋅+−α≤µ<ωβ∈αµ <2,141,max,
22
, where 
ω = R1 of αααααααα 20-8+-)x3+16-(12+)x3-(8+e 35522332 , 
yield negative consumer prices. The relationships of *cn  and 
M
cn  and 
M
an  and 
*2 an⋅  are 
ambiguous in this case. The same holds for the mixed cases, in which the monopolist will 
subsidize while the duopolists will not, which are described by 
( )









 ≈κ>αδ≤µ<α++α∈αµ 265.2,
2
8,
2
. 
Only in case of positive prices, the relationships of quantities are unambiguous and equal to 
the results in case of price equality, i.e. *** 2, a
M
aa
M
cc nnnnn ⋅<<> , and MΠ<Π⋅ *2 . Positive 
prices result, if 
( ) ( )









 α<κα++α<µ<δβ∈αµ ,
2
8,max,
2
. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the findings. 
Case *cn ⋛ Mcn  *an ⋛ Man  *2 an⋅ ⋛ Man  *2 Π⋅ ⋛ MΠ
Subsidization > < > < M
cc pp =*  
Positive Prices > < > < 
Subsidization ⋛ < ⋛ < 
Mixed ⋛ < ⋛ < Mcc pp >*  
Positive Prices > < > < 
Table 1: Relationship of quantities and profits, if consumer prices are equal or if the duopoly 
consumer price exceeds the monopoly consumer price. 
 
Welfare 
To complete our analysis, we will study the welfare effects imposed by our model. Since we 
assumed zero costs of production, monopoly profit and the sum of both providers’ profits is 
equal to producer surplus. Traditional “consumer surplus” here is the sum of the surpluses 
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created on both market sides. In the monopoly case, the market side we labeled “consumers” 
realizes a benefit of  
( ) ( )220 4
2,
−η
θ⋅=⋅−∫ McMcc
n
M
ac
M
c pndnnnp
M
c
, 
where Mcn  is given by (5), Man  is given by (6), 
M
cp  is given by (7), and ( )⋅Mcp  is the inverse of 
(2). In the duopoly case the consumer side realizes a surplus of 
( ) ( )2 22**2
0
* 21282, ζ
θ⋅η⋅α−⋅=⋅⋅−∫ ccc
n
ac
d
c pndnnnp
i
c
, 
where *cn  is given by (26), *an  is given by (25), 
*
cp  is given by (24), and ( )⋅dcp  is the inverse 
of (13). Advertisers obtain a surplus of  
( ) ( )2
2
0 44
, η−⋅
θ⋅η=⋅−∫ MaMaa
n
M
ca
M
a pndnnnp
M
a
, 
where Mcn  is given by (5), Man  is given by (6), 
M
ap  is given by (8), and ( )⋅Map  is the inverse of 
(4) in the monopoly case, and  
( ) ( )ζ θ⋅−η⋅α⋅η⋅=


 ⋅−⋅ ∫ 22,2 2**
0
*
*
aaa
n
ca
D
a pndnnnp
a
 
in the duopoly case, where *cn  is given by (26), *an  is given by (25), 
M
aa pp =*  is given by (8), 
and ( )⋅Dap  is the inverse of (12). 
 
Welfare is given by the sum of producer, consumer, and advertiser surplus. Table 2 
summarizes the relation of total welfare in monopoly optimum and duopoly equilibrium as 
well as the relations of the individual welfare components. 
 
Case Consumer Surplus 
Advertiser 
Surplus 
Producer 
Surplus 
Total 
Welfare 
Subsidization ⋛ ⋛ < ⋛ M
cc pp =*  
Positive Prices > > < > 
Subsidization ⋛ ⋛ < ⋛ 
Mixed ⋛ ⋛ < ⋛ Mcc pp >*  
Positive Prices > > < > 
Left hand side = duopoly equilibrium; right hand side = monopoly optimum 
Table 2: Comparison of welfare effects for ad-averse consumers. 
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From Table 2 we see that clear-cut welfare predictions can only be made, if no subsidization 
takes place. In this case, total welfare can unambiguously be improved by adding a second 
homogeneous platform to the industry or by permitting platform merger, even if consumer 
prices in duopoly are higher than in monopoly. The decrease of total producer surplus due to 
duopolistic competition is overcompensated by the increased consumer welfare stemming 
from lower advertising levels per platform, and the increased advertiser surplus, because in 
total more consumers can be reached. 
 
6. Numerical Examples 
In this section we illustrate the economics of our model using numerical examples and 
graphical representations. We start by presenting a case, which yields results that fit economic 
intuition from oligopolistic competition (Example I). Example II shows a situation in which 
the upper bound of the equilibria is equal to the monopoly price, representing the case of price 
equality from the previous section. Example III represents the case of price-increasing 
competition. 
 
Example I: Intuitive price effect of competition 
( ) ( )7.0,3,1,, =αθµ  
M
cp  1.304 
M
aa pp =*  0.85 
[ ]** , cc pp  [-0.193, 0.035] Man  0.230 
cpˆ  1.476 
[ ]** , aa nn  
[ ]** 2,2 aa nn  
[0.228, 0.211] 
[0.455, 0.423] 
nc
M 1.535 MΠ  2.302 
[ ]*21*21 , cc nn  [1.517, 1.408] [ ]**, ΠΠ  [0, 0.303] 
[ ]** , cc nn  [3.034, 2.817] [ ]** 2,2 ΠΠ  [0, 0.606] 
Table 3: Numerical evaluation of the models with parameters of Example I. 
 
Example I illustrates a situation with ad-averse consumers. It is a “normal” situation in terms 
of economic intuition from one-sided markets that is equilibrium consumer prices are below 
the monopoly price. Figure 1 depicts profit functions in terms of the consumer price pc, with 
advertising price pa being fixed at the monopoly price, which is 0.85 (see Table 3). The grey 
dotted curve represents monopoly profit, being maximized at Mcp , given in Table 3 as 1.304. 
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The grey dashed curve represents each platform’s profit in a symmetric situation, i.e. 
( )*, acsi ppΠ . The black dashed curve represents deviation profit of firm i, given firm j remains 
at the symmetric situation. The function is truncated, when (19) starts binding, which is at 
476.1ˆ =cp . The black curve represents Nash equilibrium profits, i.e. deviation profits being 
lower than profits in the symmetric situation, with the upper and lower bound corresponding 
to p c
* = −0.035 and p
c
* = −0.193 in Table 3. Note that in equilibrium prices may exceed 
marginal cost, which, since we assumed marginal costs to be zero, means that in equilibrium 
prices can be positive. The reason is that consumers anticipate that advertising on the non-
deviating platform will fall to zero, which ceteris paribus increases consumer utility from 
joining the non-deviating platform. The deviating platform anticipates this, and hence, does 
not deviate in marginal steps (see (19) in Proposition 3). If the minimum step size required for 
a deviating strategy is sufficiently high, positive prices may be equilibrium solutions. 
At the lower bound of the equilibrium consumer price interval, duopolists gain zero profits. 
From Figure 1, it becomes clear that zero profits do not correspond to zero consumer prices, 
but to subsidization of consumers. In a zero-profit equilibrium, all revenues from the 
monopoly-like position on the multi-homing market side are used to subsidize the single-
homing side. 
π
θ
( )cMaM pp ,Π
( )cMasi pp ,Π
Nash equilibria
( )jchighi pΠ
pc
0pc p c pc
M pc^  
Figure 1: Profit functions of Example I with fixed Maaa ppp == * . 
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Example II: Duopoly price equals monopoly price 
( ) ( )65.3,10,058.4,, =αθµ  
M
cp  0.899 
M
aa pp =*  3.854 
[ ]** , cc pp  [-4.014, 0.899] Man  1.064 
cpˆ  4.783 
[ ]** , aa nn  
[ ]** 2,2 aa nn  
[1.042, 0.676] 
[2.083, 1.353] 
M
cn  5.217 MΠ  26.085 
[ ]*21*21 , cc nn  [5.106, 3.316] [ ]**, ΠΠ  [0, 11.625] [ ]** , cc nn   [10.213, 6.632] [ ]** 2,2 ΠΠ   [0, 23.251] 
Table 4: Numerical evaluation of the models with parameters of Example II. 
 
Example II also assumes ad-averse consumers. However, in this case, the monopoly price 
equals p c
* = 0.899. This situation, which is visualized in Figure 2, represents a case in which 
there is no observable price effect of competition, assuming *cp  is the resulting Nash 
equilibrium (as we did previously in the formal analysis of Section 5). 
π
0
p c
θ pcM
( )cMaM pp ,Π
( )cMasi pp ,Π
Nash equilibria
( )jchighi pΠ
pcp
c pc^
 
Figure 2: Profit functions of Example II with fixed pa = pa* = paM. 
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From Table 4 we see that the total advertising quantity at 
( ) ( )899.0,854.3, ** ===== McccMaaa pppppp  in duopoly exceeds the monopoly level 
( )064.1083.22 * =>= Maa nn . Analogously, total consumer demand in duopoly exceeds the 
monopoly level ( )217.5632.6* =>= Mcc nn . The economic intuition is that consumers single-
home, and are therefore exposed to the advertising quantity of one platform only, which is 
lower in duopoly than in monopoly n a
* = 0.676 < naM =1.064( ). Hence, the disutility due to the 
negative externality is lower in duopoly, which yields the demand-enhancing effect of lower 
market concentration. 
nc
pc
0
A B
Cpc
k
pc
M , p c
*
nc
M n c
*
 
Figure 3: Demand-enhancing effect and competitive effect in case of price equality. 
 
Figure 3 shows the shift in consumer demand caused by the reduction of advertising per 
platform when switching from monopoly to duopoly. The black solid line represents 
consumer demand under the monopoly advertising quantity as a function of the consumer 
price. The monopoly optimum is represented by point A. Switching to a duopoly reduces 
advertising quantities per platform, which shifts the consumer demand function to the outside 
(grey dotted line; Point B). Platform operators would like to exploit the additional willingness 
to pay, and indeed joint management or joint profit-maximizing collusion would yield a price 
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above the monopoly price (see Appendix 2). This solution is represented by Point C in Figure 
3. Note that every move on a given demand curve implies a shift of the curve, because 
advertising quantities change. Therefore, Point C is on a different curve than Point B. Since 
the platform operators do not collude, competition drives prices downwards to the black 
dashed line. In Example II, these two effects exactly compensate, i.e. the observable price in 
duopoly is the same as in monopoly. In Figure 3 this is represented by moving back to Point 
B. 
 
Example III: Duopoly price above monopoly price 
( ) ( )65.3,10,1.4,, =αθµ  
M
cp  0.408 
M
aa pp =*  3.875 
[ ]** , cc pp  [-4.473, 0.836] Man  1.185 
cpˆ  4.783 
[ ]** , aa nn  
[ ]** 2,2 aa nn  
[1.154, 0.731] 
[2.308, 1.462] 
M
cn  5.267 MΠ  26.333 
[ ]*21*21 , cc nn  [5.130, 3.248] [ ]**, ΠΠ  [0, 11.915] 
[ ]** , cc nn  [10.26, 6.50] [ ]** 2,2 ΠΠ   [0, 23.830] 
Table 5: Numerical evaluation of the models with parameters of Example III. 
 
Parameters in Example III are only slightly varied as compared to Example II. As can be seen 
from Table 5 and Figure 4, the upper bound of equilibrium consumer prices now exceeds the 
monopoly price p c
* = 0.836 > pcM = 0.408( ), hence, we have a case of price-increasing 
competition. The negative effect of platform competition does not offset the positive effect of 
increased willingness to pay, so that some equilibrium prices exceed the monopoly price. 
Compared to Figure 3, we see that in Figure 5 the competitive effect does not fully 
compensate the price increasing effect of the shift in the demand curve. Analog to Figure 3, A 
represents the monopoly solution. Switching to a duopoly reduces advertising quantities, 
which shifts the demand curve to the outside. The distance AB represents the demand-
enhancing effect of lower market concentration. Due to the increased willingness to pay, 
colluding operators would choose Point C. Different from Figure 3, platform competition 
only partially compensates this effect, and pushes the consumer price down to Point D. 
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π
0 pc^pc p c θ pcM
( )cMaM pp ,Π
( )cMasi pp ,Π
Nash equilibria
( )jchighi pΠ
pc
 
Figure 4: Profit functions of Example III with fixed Maaa ppp == * . 
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Figure 5: Demand-enhancing effect and competitive effect in case of price-increasing 
competition. 
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7. Conclusion and Implications 
The results of the above analysis have implications on multiple fields of economic research. 
Keep in mind that we are studying a competitive bottleneck two-sided private goods market 
with perfect information, and that the analysis of our model is focused on those parameter sets 
that are economically plausible and yield price effects contrary to economic intuition from 
one-sided markets, namely duopoly equilibrium prices being at least as high as monopoly 
prices. Furthermore it turned out that an equilibrium solution requires ad-averse consumers 
that is a negative impact of demand from the multi-homing market side to the single-homing 
one. 
As summarized in Table 1, there are cases in which total consumer demand in the duopoly 
equilibrium exceeds consumer demand in the monopoly optimum. On first sight, this result 
does not seem too surprising as it is a well-known relationship and a reason to foster 
competition. On second thought, the reason for higher equilibrium consumer demand in 
textbook oligopoly models is that oligopolistic competition yields lower consumer prices than 
under monopoly, and therefore demand increases. In our analysis, we explicitly study cases in 
which prices are equal in monopoly and duopoly. Hence, the two-sidedness of the market 
holds a demand-enhancing effect, caused by the mere fact that total consumer demand is now 
equally split between two platforms instead of being served by one platform only. 
The two-sidedness of the market also contributes an alternative explanation for a missing 
price effect of competition. On one-sided markets, there are broadly speaking two 
explanations for missing price effects: Either the monopolist does not or cannot make use of 
her monopoly power for some reason or the oligopolists collude implicitly or explicitly. On 
two-sided markets, there might just be no price effect of competition. As Table 1 suggests, 
there is a competitive effect that causes total profits in the duopoly equilibrium to be strictly 
lower than in the monopoly case, and total advertising demand to be lower in monopoly than 
in duopoly. We neither restrict the monopolist’s optimization problem artificially nor do we 
hinder competition between the duopolists. Still and regardless of competition taking place, 
there is no observable price effect or competition even increases prices given any of the 
parameter sets described by (29). 
 
A price effect of competition, however, is the underlying assumption of empirical price-
concentration studies. These studies presume that prices increase with the concentration of the 
market, and try to estimate the magnitude of this effect. Our results suggest that this 
relationship might be negative, given certain exogenous conditions. Therefore, empirical 
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analyses yielding a negative price-concentration effect do not necessarily suffer from 
methodological or technological mistakes. Furthermore, if conditions are such that there is no 
observable price effect of competition, then there is obviously no price-concentration effect 
that could be measured. This implies that the absence of significant empirical results cannot 
be interpreted as lack of competition. In this light, it is also not sensible to study the sum of 
the prices, which the two-sided market literature usually calls the “price level”, as compared 
to “price balance”, which describes the allocation of the price level between the two market 
sides. 
Regarding the welfare effects of competition, we obtain ambiguous results and need to 
distinguish our conclusions as in Table 2. In case of positive prices, i.e. in case of prices 
above marginal cost, total welfare is always higher in duopoly than in monopoly, even though 
consumer prices might be lower in monopoly. In case of subsidization, this is not necessarily 
true. Therefore, policy makers as well as regulators aiming at welfare maximization will have 
to obtain in-dept knowledge of the environment (in the terminology of our model: “the 
parameter set”) they are facing before being able to act optimally. A brief glance at the 
prevailing price level or price balance will not suffice to make a sensible judgment. Unlike on 
common one-sided markets, fostering competition will not necessarily increase welfare. 
Similarly, merger control becomes more difficult. Under conditions of positive prices, 
mergers generally have a negative impact on total welfare. Under conditions of subsidized 
consumer prices, we cannot draw general conclusions. If, for some exogenous reason, a 
merger has to take place anyway, it will virtually always imply that one platform closes down 
(proof: see Appendix 2). This is in line with the regulator’s objective of welfare 
maximization, because welfare increases, if the operator of the two merged platforms closes 
down one of them. It even holds for distributive objectives, i.e. consumer surplus, advertiser 
surplus, and producer surplus all increase, if the operator closes down one platform in case of 
a merger (see also Appendix 2). 
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Appendix 1: 
Proof: Proposition 2 implies that operator i’s deviation profit is at least as great as the 
profit in the corresponding symmetric situation: 
Respecting that pci/equal is restricted by (16), the deviation profit departing from any symmetric 
situation (pas, pcs) is given by 
equali
c
equali
a
equali
c
s
c
equali
a
s
a
equal
i nnnpnn
////
2
)( ⋅⋅α+µ+⋅+⋅α−⋅α=Π . 
Deviation from the symmetric situation will take place, iff the profit from doing so is not 
lower than the profit in the symmetric situation, which is  
( ) ( )sasascscsascsi nppnpp ⋅+⋅=Π , . 
Proposition 2 assumes a deviation strategy which yields the same consumer utility as the 
corresponding symmetrical situation. Therefore nci/equal= ncs is fixed. 
Using (17), evaluating the inverse demand function obtained from (11) at (nas, ncs), and 
respecting that economic plausibility implies ncs ≥ 0, it is easy to see that si
equal
i Π≥Π  becomes 
after some algebraic manipulation 
( ) ( )
equali
c
s
as
a
equali
c n
nnn /
22
/
4
−η⋅−≥η−  
Note that all expressions in this inequality are fixed, except for das on the right hand side. The 
expression on the right hand side has its maximum at  
2
/ equali
cs
a
nn ⋅η−= . 
Evaluating the inequality at this maximum yields  
( ) ( )
44
2
/
2
/ η−≥η− equalicequalic nn , 
which is always true. (q.e.d.) 
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Appendix 2: 
Explicit collusion or merger on the duopoly market: 
Assume, both platform operators are able and willing to cooperate in order to maximize joint 
profits. Given (10) and (11), the operators have two options: Either they equally divide 
consumer demand between their platforms or they close down one platform and create a 
monopoly. In the first case -for reasons to be seen soon, we label it “hypothetical collusion 
case”- the optimization problem is  
∑
=


⋅+

⋅⋅=Π
2
1, 2
,
22
,
2
max
i
ci
a
i
c
cci
a
i
a
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which yields a maximum profit of  
2
2
8
2
η−
θ⋅=Π k , 
optimal quantities  
8
4
2 −η
θ⋅=kcn  and 82
,2,1
−η
θ⋅η=== kakaka nnn , 
 and optimal prices 
( )
2
,,2,1
8
4
η−
θ⋅+µ⋅η=== kickckc ppp  and Makiakaka pppp === ,,2,1 . 
Given the nonnegativity constraints on µ  and θ , and the parameter restrictions implied by the 
nonnegativity of kΠ  and MΠ , the maximum hypothetical collusion profit never exceeds the 
optimal monopoly profit (9), and consumer prices never exceed monopoly consumer prices. 
Furthermore, there is only one corner solution, in which both profits and consumer prices 
become equal. Therefore, explicit collusion or merger always implies that the operators close 
down one platform to play the monopoly solution, except, if ( ) ( )0,, >αα=αµ , in which case 
the operators are indifferent between keeping both platforms open and closing down one.  
 
Assume that for some exogenous reason it is not possible to close down one platform. In case 
of a merger, this might be due to obligations of a regulating authority. To study the welfare 
effects in this case, we compute hypothetical consumer surplus as 
( ) ( )22
2
0 8
8, −η
θ⋅=⋅−∫ kckcc
n
k
ac
k
c pndnnnp
k
c
, where 
ca
k
ccc nnppp −⋅α−θ=== 21 . 
Hypothetical advertiser surplus is  
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⋅−µ=== 221 . 
Comparing consumer, advertiser, and producer surplus of the hypothetical collusion case and 
the monopoly optimum, we find that each of these welfare components is at least as great in 
the monopoly case as it is in the hypothetical collusion case. Therefore total welfare in the 
hypothetical collusion case also never exceeds total welfare in the monopoly case. 
Comparing welfare outcomes of hypothetical collusion and duopoly equilibrium case, we 
need to distinguish the cases known from Section 4 and obtain the results presented in Table 
A1. 
Case Consumer Surplus 
Advertiser 
Surplus 
Producer 
Surplus 
Total 
Welfare 
Subsidization ⋛ ⋛ ≤ ⋛ M
cc pp =*  
Positive Prices > > < > 
Subsidization ⋛ ⋛ ≤ ⋛ 
Mixed ⋛ ⋛ ≤ ⋛ Mcc pp >*  
Positive Prices > > < > 
Left hand side = duopoly equilibrium; right hand side = duopoly collusion 
Table A1: Welfare in the case of explicit collusion 
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Appendix 3: 
Quantities at the lower bound of the Nash-equilibria 
Proposition 4 describes upper and lower bounds for equilibrium prices. Our exposition 
focused on the upper bound that yields positive equilibrium profits. In this appendix, we show 
that our qualitative results can also be obtained using the lowest equilibrium price that is 
when using the equilibrium 
( )



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α−µ==α+µ==
8
,
2 2
22
***
cc
M
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In this case, each platform realizes an advertising quantity of 
( )
8
2, 2
*****
−η
η⋅θ⋅==== acajaiaa ppnnnn , and attracts  ( ) 2***** 88, η− θ⋅==== accjcicc ppnnnn  
consumers. 
Respecting that 0,,,,,
!≥ΠΠ MMaMcsascsi nnnn , Mcc pp =*  results for 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }2,,2,22, >ασ∈αµ , where 
( ) ( ) 16612336of 2422231 −⋅+−⋅−⋅⋅+⋅⋅−+⋅=σ eexeexexeR . 
Comparing with (29), we see that 2=α  is the lower bound of α , and that in this case 
( ) 22,max =δ=δβ , so that ** cc pp = , i.e. the equilibrium is unique for ( ) ( )2,22, =αµ . 
 
Comparison of monopoly and duopoly quantities reveals that Mcc nn >* , ** 2 aMaa nnn ⋅<< , and 
MΠ<=Π⋅ 02 * , which is consistent with our findings for the equilibrium ( )** , ca pp . 
Price-increasing competition ( )Mcc pp >*  results for 
( )









 >αα
+α⋅+−α≤µ<σ∈αµ 2,141,
22
. 
As with ( )** , ca pp , MΠ<=Π⋅ 02 *  and Mcc nn ≤*  holds, while the relationship of *cn  and Mcn  
and Man  and 
*2 an⋅  is ambiguous. 
